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The Science of DNA Identification: From the 
Laboratory to the Courtroom (and Beyond) 
David H. Kaye∗ 
For much of the Twentieth Century, the scientific icon was 
the atom.  This was the “atomic age”—a period of atomic 
bombs, atomic submarines, atomic clocks, and nuclear 
medicine.  As the Twenty-first Century unrolls, the dominant 
scientific icon is no longer the atom; it is the double helix, the 
backbone of the DNA molecule.1  The sequences of the 
“nucleotide base pairs” that link the two strands of the double 
helix are seen by some bioethicists as the “secret future 
diaries” of human beings2 and by some scientists as “in 
essence, . . . what makes humans human.”3 
This imagery and essentialism is exaggerated,4 but that is 
a topic for another occasion.  This article will focus on 
©  2007 David H. Kaye. 
∗  Regents Professor, ASU Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law; Professor, 
School of Life Sciences; and Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and 
Technology. 
This article was derived from a Deinard Memorial Lecture on Law and 
Medicine, at the University of Minnesota Law School, on January 31, 2006. 
 1. See DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE 
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON (1995); Dorothy Nelkin, Molecular Metaphors: The 
Gene in Popular Discourse, 2 NATURE REV. GENETICS 555 (2001). 
 2. George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting 
Coded ‘Future Diaries,’ 270 JAMA 2346 (1993). 
 3. Julie Meyne, The Human Genome Project: Impact on the Prevalence 
of Diabetes, Aug. 1997, 
http://darwin.nmsu.edu/~molbio/diabetes/human.html.  Cf. Nicholas Wade, 
Life Is Pared to Basics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at F3 (reporting the 
concern expressed by a medical ethicist that “when biologists sequenced the 
first human chromosome last month, they called it ‘the first chapter in the 
book of life, as if life is chromosomes’”). 
 4. See, e.g., RICHARD LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX: GENE, ORGANISM, 
AND ENVIRONMENT (2000); Eric T. Juengst, FACE Facts: Why Human 
Genetics Will Always Provoke Bioethics, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267 (2004). 
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sequences of DNA base-pairs that are of little or no importance 
in medicine but that have become exceedingly important in 
law.  I refer to the genetic features used by forensic scientists 
to characterize biological trace evidence that contains DNA—
primarily blood stains, semen, saliva, and hair.  The variations 
in DNA sequences, which are found at particular locations, or 
“loci,” in the genome, are known as “alleles.”  Matching DNA 
alleles can be used to ascertain the likely source of a crime-
scene sample and to establish family relationships.  Testimony 
as to these DNA loci has appeared in cases of child support, 
domestic relations, immigration and naturalization, slander, 
and even judicial discipline.  But it is the criminal justice 
system that has benefited the most from forensic DNA 
identification, both in terms of exonerating the innocent and 
convicting the guilty. 
This article will survey the history, nature, and uses of the 
science of human DNA identification as it has moved from the 
laboratory to the courtroom.  Part I describes the process by 
which courts admit (or exclude) scientific evidence and how 
scientists have responded to the legal milieu.  The tale is one 
of legal doctrine, of lawyers and their limitations, of courts and 
confusion, of journalists and misreporting, and of adversarial 
science and egos.5  Part II moves from these doctrinal and 
historical developments in the law of evidence to several of the 
ethical, social, and constitutional questions created by current 
developments in forensic DNA analysis, and by the creation 
and expansion of forensic DNA repositories and databases. 
I.  THE LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF DNA IDENTIFICATION 
EVIDENCE 
Only a few concepts from the law of evidence are needed to 
describe the judicial response to efforts to introduce DNA 
 5. The historical survey pretermits the use of DNA typing in post-
conviction relief.  These cases have played an extremely important role in 
criminal justice, but they are less directly connected to admissibility issues.  
For discussions of DNA exonerations, see EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., 
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE 
OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996); BARRY 
SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Paul C. Giannelli, 
Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on Forensic Science, 35 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 627 (2001); Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double 
Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
547 (2002). 
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evidence.  All expert witnesses—scientific and otherwise—are 
expected to have specialized knowledge that can assist the jury 
in understanding the facts.  In almost all jurisdictions, 
however, scientific experts must clear an additional hurdle.  
This special scrutiny of scientific methodology varies among 
jurisdictions, but two major standards have emerged, the 
general-acceptance standard and the Daubert standard.  The 
general-acceptance standard, introduced in a 1923 case 
entitled Frye v. United States, requires proof that most 
knowledgeable scientists accept a theory or technique as valid 
and reliable.6 The Daubert standard, adopted in 1993 in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, does not treat 
general acceptance among scientists as definitive but considers 
it to be one factor that helps demonstrate the underlying 
validity of the theory.7  The two standards are quite flexible 
and depend entirely on the rigor with which the court chooses 
to apply them.8 
Starting in the late 1980s, courts across the country began 
to apply these standards to DNA evidence.9  The ensuing legal 
history can be divided into at least four phases: (1) a period of 
uncritical acceptance of Variable Number Tandem Repeat 
(VNTR) typing; (2) serious challenges to analytical methods 
and the statistical interpretation of the results; (3) renewed 
acceptance of DNA evidence; and (4) acceptance of more 
advanced systems of DNA analysis. 
A.  PHASE I: UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF VNTRS 
The first genetic loci used in forensic testing were 
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms (RFLPs). These 
are variations in the length of the DNA sequence between two 
sites at which bacterial enzymes cut the long DNA molecule 
into pieces.  For example, the population might include some 
people with 3,200 base pairs between the two restriction sites, 
some with 1,200 base pairs, and some with both (one on each 
chromosome).  Human geneticists had been using RFLP 
technology for years as markers for mutations that produced 
 6. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 8. See D.H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
EXPERT EVIDENCE (2004). 
 9. By the end of the 1980s, a substantial minority of federal circuits and 
states had rejected the general-acceptance standard of Frye in favor of a 
“reliability-plus” standard comparable to Daubert.  See id. 
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genetic diseases.  These markers, however, were usually 
simple systems with a few easily distinguishable alleles, such 
as the two postulated above. 
The type of loci that proved powerful enough for human 
identification was discovered serendipitously in 1984 by 
geneticist, Sir Alec Jeffries, at the University of Leicester.10  
These VNTR loci involve many possible alleles that are almost 
continuous in their lengths.  A short sequence of base pairs is 
repeated, back to back, various numbers of times.  Instead of 
only two possible alleles (such as the 1,200 and 3,200 base-pair 
alleles), there can be many alleles of different lengths.  The 
lengths have no medical significance, but they do give rise to 
measurable differences that enable analysts to distinguish 
among different individuals.  Figure 1 is an “autoradiograph” 
showing the alleles of one VNTR locus in eleven different 
people.  The DNA fragments, which carry a negative charge, 
have been pulled through a slab of gelatinous material by an 
electric field so that they have moved distances proportional to 
their lengths.  The dark spots mark the final positions of the 
fragments.  Shorter fragments have moved farther down the 
gel.  Each person has either one or two alleles (discernibly 
different fragment lengths) that appear in each vertical lane. 
 
FIGURE 1.  AUTORADIOGRAPH OF VNTR ALLELES AT A SINGLE LOCUS IN 
ELEVEN INDIVIDUALS11 
 
                                                          
 10. See Alec J. Jeffreys, Highly Variable Minisatellites and DNA 
Fingerprints, 15 BIOCHEMICAL SOC’Y TRANS. 309 (1987); Alec J. Jeffreys et 
al., DNA “Fingerprints” and Segregation Analysis of Multiple Markers in 
Human Pedigrees, 39 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 11 (1986); A.J. Jeffreys et al., 
Individual-Specific ‘Fingerprints’ of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985); 
Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable “Minisatellite” Regions in Human DNA, 
314 NATURE 67 (1985). 
 
 11. The autoradiograph was produced by the FBI in 1988.  It is 
reproduced from OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: 
FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 47 (1990). 
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In the earliest DNA cases, the technology was the subject 
of lopsided testimony.  In some instances, defendants objected 
that the technology as adapted to forensic usage was not 
generally accepted or adequately validated, but they produced 
no experts to question the claim of general acceptance.  In one 
Texas case, Kelly v. State,12 the defense produced an expert 
who, as the court delicately put it, “was certified to teach life 
and earth sciences in public schools” and who testified that 
radioactivity, which had been introduced into medicine in the 
late 1930s,13 was too new to be generally accepted.14  Not 
surprisingly, this idiosyncratic view did not prevail over the 
unequivocal assurances of general acceptance from three 
university or medical school professors who testified for the 
prosecution. 
The courts in these lopsided cases had little difficulty 
finding general acceptance or scientific validity.15  Such cases 
can have a snowball or avalanche effect.  Other courts cite 
them as having found general acceptance or scientific validity.  
The snowball grows until it becomes an avalanche, 
increasingly difficult to stop even if there are serious grounds 
to question the scientific technique.  This is currently the 
situation with dermatoglyphic fingerprinting.  Fingerprints 
obviously are highly variable, but the validity and reliability of 
analysts working with latent prints of varying quality have not 
been rigorously studied.  Yet, because the technique is so well 
ensconced, courts have been reluctant to apply faithfully the 
Daubert standard of scientific validity.16 
B.  PHASE II: CHALLENGES TO ANALYTICAL METHODS, 
STATISTICS, AND POPULATION GENETICS MODELS 
Despite the initial momentum of DNA evidence, defense 
counsel were able to raise important questions.  The details of 
the laboratory procedures were questioned, and limitations 
were identified in the statistical and population-genetics 
models used in estimating the frequencies of the DNA types.  
 12. 792 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990). 
 13. See, e.g., João José Pedroso de Lima, Radioisotopes in Medicine, 19 
EUROPEAN J. PHYSICS 485, 485 (1998). 
 14. Radioactive isotopes are used in producing the bands in the 
autoradiograph. 
 15. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205(B) (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th 
ed. 2006). 
 16. See, e.g., id. § 207(A). 
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One case that undermined judicial confidence is People v. 
Castro.17  In this case, the defense found strong grounds to 
question the interpretation of the DNA tests conducted by 
Lifecodes, a commercial laboratory specializing in forensic 
DNA testing.  The defense witnesses included Eric Lander, a 
mathematician-turned-biologist at MIT who was to become a 
leader in the Human Genome Project.  Richard Roberts, who 
was to receive the Noble prize a few years later, testified for 
the state at a twelve-week hearing that resulted in a 
transcript of some 5,000 written pages.  Judge Gerald 
Sheindlin, who went on to write two books on DNA evidence,18 
excluded the testimony of a DNA match, referring to the 
defense’s “piercing attack on each molecule of evidence.”19 
When scientists of this caliber differ, courts normally are 
at a loss to decide who is right.  Here, the court had no 
difficulty.  After reviewing Lander’s concerns, Roberts 
proposed that the scientists for both parties meet without the 
lawyers.  This unchaperoned tête-à-tête resulted in a joint 
statement concluding that “the DNA data in this case are not 
scientifically reliable enough to support the assertion that the 
samples do or do not match.”20  The scientists subscribing to 
the statement agreed that Lifecodes had failed to perform 
experiments that might have explained certain anomalous 
bands and that the reported probability of a random match 
“understates the actual probability.”21 
Despite the defects in the laboratory work in Castro and a 
few other cases, most courts continued to find forensic RFLP-
 17. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. 1989).  Indeed, Castro was said to be “the first 
serious challenge to DNA ‘fingerprinting.’”  Robert D. Mcfadden, Reliability of 
DNA Testing Challenged by Judge’s Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1989, at B1. 
According to Clay Strange,  
what had been widely accepted in the press and hailed as a major 
advance was now viewed skeptically, even as unreliable by one New 
York Times reporter. The fact that Castro was based “on technical 
aspects of a particular case and not the fundamental scientific 
validity of DNA technology” was obscured. 
Clay Strange, Book Review, DNA’s Search for Truth, 83 JUDICATURE 165, 166 
(1999). 
 18. BLOOD TRAIL: TRUE CRIME MYSTERIES SOLVED BY DNA DETECTIVES 
(1996); GENETIC FINGERPRINTING: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF DNA EVIDENCE 
(1996). 
 19. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996. 
 20. Roger Parloff, How Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld Tripped Up the 
DNA Experts, AM. LAWYER., Dec. 1989, at 1. 
 21. Id. 
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VNTR analyses to be generally accepted, and a number of 
states provided for admissibility of DNA tests by legislation.22 
A more sweeping attack on DNA profiling that began in 
Castro led to a wave of cases in which many courts held that 
estimates of the probability of a coincidentally matching VNTR 
profile were inadmissible.  These estimates relied on a 
simplified population-genetics model for the frequencies of 
VNTR profiles that treats each race as a large, randomly 
mating population.  Some prominent scientists claimed that 
the applicability of the model had not been adequately verified 
and that it was inaccurate because ethnic or religious 
subgroups tend to mate preferentially among themselves.23  A 
heated debate on the significance of this population 
substructure spilled over from courthouses to scientific 
journals and convinced the supreme courts of several states 
that general acceptance was lacking.24  A 1992 report of the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), as a compromise, 
proposed a more “conservative” computational method, dubbed 
“the ceiling principle” by its inventor and National Research 
Council committee member, Eric Lander.25  The apparent need 
for a compromise seemed to undermine the claim of scientific 
acceptance of the less conservative procedure that was in 
general use.  Other NAS recommendations (for improvements 
in quality control and assurance and more objective standards 
for declaring matches) also were seen by some observers as 
demanding the exclusion of DNA evidence.  An article by New 
York Times biomedical reporter Gina Kolata propounded a 
 22. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25. This statute provides that 
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis . . . 
are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that 
DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method of 
identifying characteristics in an individual’s genetic material upon a 
showing that the offered testimony meets the standards for 
admissibility set forth in the Rules of Evidence. 
Presumably, it is intended to relieve the state of the burden of showing that a 
particular DNA typing method satisfies Frye (the standard used in 
Minnesota), but, by and large, the Minnesota courts have studiously ignored 
it.  See, e.g., State v. Kromah, 657 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 2003). 
 23. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts over DNA Fingerprinting: A 
Bitter Debate Is Raging over How the Results of this New Forensic Technique 
Are Interpreted in Court, 254 SCIENCE 1721 (1991) 
 24. See David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, 
and the Courts, 7 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 101 (1993). 
 25. COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 
COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE (1992). 
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particularly tendentious view of the report.26  After a special 
press conference called by Victor McCusick, the chairman of 
the committee, the New York Times (grudgingly if you read the 
fine print) confessed error.27 
C.  PHASE III: RENEWED ACCEPTANCE 
At this juncture the legal history entered a third phase.  
The 1992 NAS report’s advocacy of the “ceiling principle” for 
computing random-match probabilities without assuming 
random mating within broadly defined races came in for 
withering criticism.  Many population geneticists regarded this 
procedure as ad hoc and excessively conservative.28  Before 
long, the procedure was denigrated as being neither a “ceiling” 
nor a “principle.”29  In 1996, a second NAS panel concluded 
that data collected on subpopulations from across the world 
confirmed that the usual method of estimating frequencies of 
VNTR profiles in broad racial groups generally was sound.30  
Moreover, in the period between the two reports, an FBI 
geneticist and Eric Lander joined forces to write commentary 
in Nature with the reassuring title “DNA Fingerprinting 
Dispute Laid to Rest.”31  The article pointed to improvements 
in laboratory standards and additional research into 
subpopulations.  Impressed with Lander’s sudden, public 
conversion to the view that the population-genetics issues were 
no longer serious obstacles to admissibility, and reassured by 
the 1996 NAS report, courts began to regard concerns over 
population substructure as passé.  In this manner, the courts 
almost invariably returned to the earlier view that the 
statistics associated with VNTR profiling are generally 
accepted and scientifically valid both in major population 
 26. Gina Kolata, U.S. Panel Seeking Restrictions On Use of DNA in 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at A1. The article began by claiming that 
the committee had said that DNA typing “should not be allowed in court in 
the future unless a more scientific basis is established.”  It insisted that “[t]he 
new report . . . says courts should cease to admit DNA evidence . . . .” Id. 
 27. Gina Kolata, Chief Says Panel Backs Courts’ Use of a Genetic Test, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A23. 
 28. See Peter Aldhous, Geneticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically 
Flawed, 259 SCIENCE 755 (1993). 
 29. Kaye, supra note 24. 
 30. COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996). 
 31. Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid 
to Rest, 371 NATURE 735 (1994). 
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groups and in subgroups.32 
D.  PHASE IV: ACCEPTANCE OF PCR-BASED METHODS 
In the final phase of the judicial acceptance of DNA 
evidence, prosecutors moved away from VNTR loci and 
introduced matches based on other DNA features.  Analysis of 
these sites of DNA variation was made possible by the use of 
the polymerase chain reaction (PCR).  Discovered by the 
colorful Kary Mullis,33 PCR is a chemical process that makes 
copies of small DNA fragments, then copies of copies, then 
copies of all those copies, and so on.34  Contrary to the 
nomenclature of many judicial opinions, PCR is not a forensic 
typing method.  It is simply a preliminary step.  Once the 
particular loci of interest have been “amplified,” perhaps a 
million-fold, with PCR, they can be analyzed in various ways.  
The most common procedure examines Short Tandem Repeat 
(STR) loci, which have a core element of a handful of base 
pairs repeated a relatively small number of times.  Per locus, 
they are less variable than VNTRs, but much easier to 
measure and interpret.35 
As results obtained with the PCR-based methods entered 
the courtroom, it became necessary to ask whether these 
methods also rested on a solid scientific foundation or were 
 32. Two cases illustrate these developments. In People v. Miller, 670 
N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1996), the Supreme Court of Illinois observed that “while 
there has been some controversy over the use of the product rule in 
calculating the frequency of a DNA match, that controversy appears to be 
dissipating.” Id. at 731-32. The court cited the Lander-Budowle paper as proof 
that “[t]he concerns . . . appear not to have been borne out by empirical 
studies.” Id. at 732.  The next year, in People v. Hickey, 687 N.E.2d 910 (Ill. 
1997), the same court determined that a Frye hearing no longer was required 
in light of Miller and the fact that  
[t]he 1996 report concludes that “[t]he state of the profiling 
technology and the methods for estimating frequencies and related 
statistics have progressed to the point where the admissibility of 
properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt” 
and that the report “also specifically concludes that sufficient data 
have been gathered to establish that the interim ceiling principle is 
not needed and further recommends that, in general, the calculation 
of a profile frequency should be made with the product rule.”  
Id. at 291. 
 33. See KARY MULLIS, DANCING NAKED IN THE MIND FIELD (1998); Emily 
Yoffe, Is Kary Mullis God?, ESQUIRE, July 1, 1994, at 68. 
 34. See, e.g., PCR TECHNOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS FOR DNA 
AMPLIFICATION (H.A. Erlich ed., 1989). 
 35. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS (2d ed. 2005). 
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generally accepted in the scientific community.  The opinions 
were practically unanimous in holding that the current 
laboratory procedures for STR typing (as well as earlier 
systems) satisfy these standards.36  They also held that the so-
called “product rule” for estimating the frequencies of DNA 
types in major population groups is scientifically sound and 
generally accepted for the loci investigated in these tests.37 
In sum, in little more than a decade, DNA typing made 
the transition from a novel set of methods for identification to 
a relatively mature and well studied forensic technology.  
Although some of the defense objections in this period seem 
misconceived or overblown, the adversary system is structured 
to exaggerate or amplify differences in the scientific 
community.  Moreover, whatever hyperbole there was—and 
there was hyperbole on both sides—the defense criticisms 
contributed to improvements in protocols, more extensive 
proficiency testing, and research in population genetics and 
statistics. 
II.  EMERGING ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
Although the most significant issues related to the 
admissibility of forensic DNA testing have been resolved, 
several aspects of the investigative phase of DNA work remain 
highly contentious.  These include inferring race or ethnicity 
from crime-scene samples, acquiring DNA samples without 
consent or judicial warrants, and amassing and using DNA 
databases for law-enforcement purposes. 
A. INFERRING RACE OR ETHNICITY FROM CRIME-SCENE 
SAMPLES 
A former official at the National Human Genome Research 
Institute stated: “Of high concern to us is the use of DNA as a 
high-tech form of racial profiling, [to determine the] 
probabilities . . . of an individual being from this race or that 
ethnic group.”38  But why should this practice be considered 
 36. 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT 
TESTIMONY § 32:3 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2006). 
 37. See cases cited in id.  
 38. Kathy Hudson, Keynote Address at the American University Law 
Review Symposium: The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: 
The American Legal System’s Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science 
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“racial profiling”?  In some cases, the crime-scene sample will 
point to African-Americans; in others, it will point to Whites.  
There is no pre-established racial profile.  For Equal 
Protection purposes, it is comparable to relying on an 
eyewitness’s description of the culprit as Asian, or Hispanic, or 
Black, or White to focus an investigation.39  Admittedly, the 
categories are socially constructed and imperfectly correlated 
with genetic markers, but anthropologists have produced 
ancestry-informative markers (AIMs),40 and they may be 
roughly indicative of physical features.41  If genetic analysis of 
ancestry is reasonably accurate, one could argue that it is 
protective of the rights of minorities, as it reduces the risk of 
initial stereotyping and focuses the investigation on the group 
where it belongs. 
B.  ACQUISITION OF SUSPECTS’ DNA 
Many more civil-liberties issues arise when police seek to 
acquire DNA samples from suspects for comparison to samples 
from crime scenes.42  The government must conform to the 
Fourth Amendment, which refers to “[t]he right of the people 
to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures” 
and specifies that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”43  However, precisely when a judicial warrant and 
probable cause is required is not always apparent. 
The questions here include the following: (1) May police go 
(Oct. 19, 2001), in 51 AM. U. L. REV. 431, 442 (2002). 
 39. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or 
Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 447-51 (2001). 
 40. E.g., Heather E. Collins-Schramm et al., Mexican American Ancestry-
Informative Markers: Examination of Population Structure and Marker 
Characteristics in European Americans, Mexican Americans, Amerindians 
and Asian, 114 HUM. GENETICS 263 (2004); Mary-Anne Enoch et al., Using 
Ancestry-Informative Markers to Define Populations and Detect Population 
Stratification, 20 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 19 (2006). 
 41. The commercial firm, DNAPrint, offers the following service to police 
agencies: “DNAWitnessTM will provide the percentage of genetic make up 
amongst the four possible groups of Sub-Saharan African, Native American, 
East Asian, and European.”  DNAPrint Home Page, 
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/productsandservices/forensics/ (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2007).  The company advertises that “We have performed about 
13,000 ‘blind’ tests to date.  For example, one west coast police department 
sent 16 samples collected from members of the department. The results were 
judged by them to be correct (consistent with phenotype and self-held notions 
of ancestry) for all 16 samples.”  Id. 
 42. See generally Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 39. 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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door-to-door, or car-to-car, canvassing for “voluntary” DNA 
samples but threatening individuals with becoming targets for 
further investigation if they refuse to cooperate? (2) May the 
state obtain tissue samples from medical providers without the 
knowledge or consent of the donor?44 (3) If DNA is extracted 
without any bodily intrusion (for example, by following a 
suspect and collecting shed hairs or saliva from a beer mug at 
a bar), is there a search that must be justified under the 
Fourth Amendment? (4) May police trick a suspect into 
providing DNA, for example, by mailing the suspect a letter on 
law firm stationery saying he is eligible for money in a class-
action lawsuit and then recovering saliva from the envelope 
containing the claim form?45 
Most of these practices have been undertaken, and lower 
courts have approved of some of them.46  Certainly, some 
deception in interrogations47 and the warrantless collection of 
“abandoned” possessions48 are accepted with regard to 
acquiring other types of information in criminal investigations.  
To reach a different conclusion here would be to indulge in 
“genetics exceptionalism,” and that is precisely what some 
legal commentators have proposed.49 
 44. There are reports that this was done in Wichita to see if Dennis 
Rader might be the notorious BTK killer. See Readers Still Want Answers on 
BTK, WICHITA EAGLE, July 3, 2005 (reporting that  
In an effort to hide from Rader that they were zeroing in on him as a 
BTK suspect, investigators obtained a subpoena for his daughter’s 
DNA from a tissue sample stored at a medical clinic in Kansas.  It 
was processed within a week before Rader’s arrest on Feb. 25. After 
Rader was arrested, authorities took a DNA sample from his 
daughter at her Michigan home to help confirm earlier test results.). 
 45. See Tracy Johnson, Convicted Murderer Says Officers Broke Law with 
DNA Trick Police Ruse Case Argued, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REP., 
Jan. 27, 2006, at B1. 
 46. E.g., State v. Buckman, 613 N.W.2d 463 (Neb. 2000) (defendant 
abandoned cigarette butt with saliva in police station). 
 47. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (“Miranda 
warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to 
a[n undercover] law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement”). 
 48. See John P. Ludington, Search and Seizure: What Constitutes 
Abandonment of Personal Property Within Rule That Search and Seizure of 
Abandoned Property Is Not Unreasonable—Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381 
(1985). 
 49. Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth 
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006) (concluding 
that courts are unlikely to extend Fourth Amendment protection to “covert 
involuntary DNA sampling” but advocating a statutory requirement for a 
warrant). 
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C.  DNA DATABASES 
In addition to the traditional use of trace evidence to show 
the presence of a known suspect at a crime scene, all American 
states, the federal government, and many other countries have 
compelled convicted offenders to provide DNA samples for the 
creation of computer-searchable databases of their identifying 
profiles.  These are used when there is no known suspect to 
test.  There are over four million records in the FBI’s National 
Database Index System (NDIS).  The DNA records consist of 
the STRs at thirteen loci selected by the FBI for common use.  
The numbers are similar to passport or Social Security 
numbers in that they are essentially arbitrary strings of digits 
assigned by nature.50 
These databases help police to solve cases that have 
baffled them for decades and to catch previously convicted 
offenders who commit new crimes.  In Virginia, there was the 
rapist who blew out a candle before attacking his victim.  The 
candle had his saliva on it.  There was the burglar who wore a 
pair of socks on his hands and left no fingerprints.  But he left 
the socks that contained skin cells.  There was the bank robber 
who dropped his ski mask.  All were identified by checking the 
DNA profiles against the state’s database of convicted felons.51 
At the outset, privacy advocates maintained that sex-
offender databases were just the camel’s nose and the 
government would follow up with greatly expanded databases.  
They were correct.  The trend is toward all-felons databases.52 
 50. Professor Joh asserts that “some markers now thought to be 
meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain predictive medical 
information as the science progresses.” Id. at 870. The basis for this claim is 
flimsy.  None of the NDIS markers are known to be predictive or diagnostic of 
any medical condition.  The news stories on which Professor Joh relies do not 
suggest otherwise. D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006). 
 51. Profile: Use of a DNA Data Bank to Catch Criminals in Virginia, 
(Nat’l Public Radio Morning Edition, Mar. 8, 2001), available at 2001 WL 
9326731. 
 52. See, e.g., Amy Norton, DNA Databases: The New Dragnet, 19 THE 
SCIENTIST 50 (2005); Rick Weiss, Vast DNA Bank Pits Policing vs. Privacy: 
Data Stored on 3 Million Americans, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1 (“At 
least 38 states now have laws to collect DNA from people found guilty of 
misdemeanors, in some cases for such crimes as shoplifting and 
fortunetelling. At least 28 now collect from juvenile offenders, too.”). The 
experience with expanded databases has greatly undermined the prediction 
of the first National Academy committee that “it is clear that crimes of most 
types will not afford the opportunity to recover relevant biological evidence 
that will allow the police to identify an unknown suspect—i.e., the 
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Furthermore, the individuals who might be implicated by 
DNA database searches are not necessarily limited to those 
whose samples are in the database.53  When a Winston-Salem 
newspaper editor was raped and killed in 2003, the DNA trace 
did not fully match anything in the database, but one 
convicted offender was a near match.  This similarity 
suggested that although the criminal whose DNA was on file 
was not the murderer, a sibling might be.  Sure enough, 
detectives found that there was a brother.  By following the 
brother, detectives were able to collect DNA evidence from 
saliva he left on discarded cigarette butts.  His DNA proved to 
be a perfect match to the sample from the crime scene.54  Does 
such “near-match searching” infringe any rights or exceed 
statutory authority, or is it simply a clever investigative 
practice?55 
Concerns also have been voiced with regard to the uses to 
which the DNA data and samples might be put.56  Some 
bioethicists and law professors have claimed that the laws 
countenance research with offender records or samples in 
violation of the Nuremburg Code and the basic principle of 
medical ethics and human rights that forbids medical 
experimentation on human subjects.57  The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) fears that the government will use the 
samples in a search “for a crime gene . . . .”58 
perpetrator’s own body fluids. They include larcenies, burglaries, and 
assaults . . . .” COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, 
supra note 25, at 120. 
 53. See, e.g., Frederick R. Bieber et al., Human Genetics: Finding 
Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 SCIENCE 1315 (2006); David 
R. Paoletti et al., Assessing the Implications for Close Relatives in the Event of 
Similar But Nonmatching DNA Profiles, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 161 (2006). 
 54. Richard Willing, Suspects Get Snared by a Relative’s DNA, USA 
TODAY, June 8, 2005, at A1. This proof of the brother’s guilt triggered the 
release from prison of Darryl Hunt, who had been imprisoned for the past 
eighteen years.  Id. 
 55. The most thoughtful analysis of this question published to date is 
Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to 
Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 248 (2006). 
 56. See D.H. Kaye, Bioethics, Bench, and Bar: Selected Arguments in 
Landry v. Attorney General, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2000). 
 57. Brief for Institute for Science, Law and Technology and Illinois 
Institute of Technology as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, Landry v. 
Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999) (No. SJC-07899). 
 58. Interview by Ira Flatow with Nadine Strossen, on National Public 
Radio Talk of the Nation, (May 25, 2001), available at 
http://www.sciencefriday.com/pages/2001/May/hour1_052501.html; see also 
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In my opinion, claims like these are grossly overstated.  
The kinds of research that are allowed are far less threatening 
than pawing through millions of personally identified samples 
for a mythical “crime gene.”  The federal DNA Identification 
Act of 1994 limits research to “identification research and 
protocol development purposes,” and then only “if personally 
identifiable information is removed.”59  The states must 
adhere to the same privacy protections if they are to receive 
federal funding for their forensic DNA laborato
Criminal DNA databases also prompt Fourth Amendment 
concerns.61  Several states have adopted laws to take DNA 
from people when they are merely brought into custody.  With 
almost no publicity, President Bush signed comparable federal 
legislation into law.62  Almost without exception, courts have 
held that convicted offenders can be compelled to contribute 
their DNA without probable cause (or any sort of 
individualized suspicion) and without a warrant.63  They have 
Speeding DNA Evidence Processing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Barry 
Steinhardt, Associate Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington, 
D.C.) (describing DNA samples as harboring our “most intimate secrets,” 
possibly including “genetic markers for aggression, substance addiction, 
criminal tendencies and sexual orientation”), available at 2000 WL 342540. 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (2000). 
 60. For a more thorough analysis of the DNA database statutes, see D.H. 
Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (2006). 
 61. Much of my discussion of this issue is contained in D. H. Kaye, Who 
Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other 
Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188 (2006), which 
pursues the matter in greater depth.  
 62. Section 1004(a)(1)(A) of the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 amended 
the DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132, by providing that 
“[t]he Attorney General may, as prescribed by the Attorney General in 
regulation, collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested or from 
non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the 
United States.”  As codified, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) provides that  
[t]he Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish 
an index of—(1) DNA identification records of—(A) persons convicted 
of crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in an indictment or 
information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples 
are collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that DNA 
samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination 
purposes shall not be included in the National DNA Index System. 
 63. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Validity, Construction, and Operation of 
State DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R.5th 239 (2000); Richard P. Shafer, 
Validity, Construction, and Application of DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination 
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14135 et seq. and 10 U.S.C.A. § 1565, 187 A.L.R. 
Fed. 373 (2003). 
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done so on two theories.  The first theory looks to Supreme 
Court cases that dispense with the warrant requirement 
“when ‘special needs beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable.’”64  Certain programs of 
compulsory drug testing of federal employees, for example, 
have been upheld as reasonable because they serve the 
government’s special interest as an employer in reducing the 
use of drugs in its work force or in safeguarding the public 
with whom these employees deal.65 
However, the Supreme Court has cut back on this 
exception by blocking its extension to programs whose 
“primary purpose” is the enforcement of criminal law.  For 
example, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,66 the Medical 
University of South Carolina began testing urine samples from 
pregnant patients for drugs to build criminal cases that would 
induce them to accept substance-abuse treatment.  Because 
“the immediate objective of the searches was to generate 
evidence for law enforcement purposes,”67 the Supreme Court 
held that the testing program could not be sustained under the 
special-needs doctrine. 
The logic of the primary-purpose limitation is not entirely 
clear.  It seems odd to maintain that the balance of interests 
permits dispensing with warrants or individualized suspicion 
when non-law enforcement interests alone are pursued, but 
not when both law enforcement and non-law enforcement 
interests reinforce each other.  Be that as it may, the 
convicted-offender databases exist primarily to facilitate the 
identification of the perpetrators of sexual assaults, murders, 
and many other crimes.  They have some secondary uses, such 
as identifying missing persons or disaster victims, but criminal 
investigation is their raison d’etre. 
Thus, the special-needs doctrine (as articulated in 
Ferguson) is a poor fit to DNA databases.  Many courts 
therefore have taken a different tack.  Without explaining 
why, they either have abandoned the notion that there needs 
 64. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 65. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 
(1989). 
 66. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 67. Id. at 83. 
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to be a categorical exception to the warrant requirement, or 
they have a created a sui generis exception for DNA databases.  
These courts maintain that the DNA data are extremely useful 
in preventing and investigating crime, while the bodily 
intrusion is minimal, the personal information only reveals 
individual identity, and the individuals’ status as a convicted 
criminal diminishes his privacy.  In this way, they have upheld 
taking DNA after conviction.68 
Despite its popularity with the courts, a DNA-convicted-
offender-only exception to the warrant requirement is 
unsatisfactory.  Reasoning that a conviction works a perpetual 
forfeiture of Fourth Amendment protection is disturbing.  I 
understand, of course, that convicts have a reduced 
expectation of privacy while they are incarcerated, but why is 
there a more permanent loss of privacy?  Would we say that a 
man or woman who was once convicted of a crime but has long 
since completed the sentence has no claim to the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment?  That the police are free to enter his 
home at their whim? 
I propose dealing with the problem, not by diminishing the 
rights of convicted offenders, but by recognizing a new, well 
cabined “biometric identification exception” to the warrant 
requirement.  Certain dicta suggest that the Supreme Court 
might uphold compulsory acquisition of biometric data from a 
person when (1) the process is not physically or mentally 
invasive, (2) the data are useful primarily to link individuals to 
crime scenes or to establish the true identity of a given 
individual, and (3) the data are valid, reliable, and effective for 
this purpose.69  In these circumstances, harms to individuals 
and the benefits of judicial review are minor; hence, the 
balance between individual privacy and government interests 
points to the reasonableness of the collection and use of the 
identifying data without a judicial warrant.  Practices such as 
taking fingerprints, mug-shots, and DNA even at the time of 
an arrest could be sustained under this exception. 
The biometric exception also has the virtue of opening up 
public debate on the advisability of a population-wide 
database.  If we wanted to start to build such a database, we 
could start now, as an addition to newborn screening 
programs.  The police would not need to collect or store the 
samples.  The resulting, comprehensive database—the records 
 68. Kaye, supra note 61, at 192. 
 69. See id. at 193. 
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of the essentially random digits in each person’s DNA—would 
have a variety of advantages.70  For example, the inclusive 
database could not be seen as disproportionately burdensome 
on minorities, who, for a variety of reasons, tend to be swept 
into the criminal justice system.  According to the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, about one in three black males, one in six 
Hispanic males, and one in seventeen white males will go to 
prison during their lifetime.71  If criminal databases mirror 
these disparities, they will add to the corrosive perception that 
the criminal justice system is stacked against African-
Americans and other minorities. 
In the end, perhaps a population-wide database is not 
desirable.  I am not prepared to urge its implementation 
tomorrow.  But its time may come.  Then the challenge will be 
to construct it so as to enhance public order and security while 
respecting legitimate individual privacy rights.  The double 
helix is not only an icon of the “molecule of life.”  It also is a 
metaphor for the intertwining of genetics and the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The science of human DNA identification has matured 
greatly since its exuberant introduction in the late 1980s.  
After years of bitter debates about laboratory techniques, 
statistics, and population genetics, the admissibility of 
properly conducted DNA tests of highly variable loci is no 
longer in question.  Along with this successful courtroom 
implementation of DNA identification technology have come 
increasingly aggressive uses of DNA in investigating crimes.  
These developments have attracted the attention of 
bioethicists and civil-liberties advocates.  In evaluating the 
expansion of DNA databases for law enforcement and other 
uses of the forensic science, however, it cannot be assumed 
that all the norms that are accepted and valuable in the 
context for biomedical research with human subjects 
necessarily are appropriate in the context of forensic 
investigation with human suspects.  Establishing reasonable 
 70. See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: 
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. 
L. REV. 413 (2003). 
 71. Thomas P. Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prevalence of 
Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001 (2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/piusp01.htm.  
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limits on the technological imperative requires an appreciation 
and understanding of the law of criminal procedure, the costs 
and benefits of the techniques, and the political and ethical 
principles that foster a free society of autonomous individuals.  
This brief review of history and current issues does not answer 
the question of how far the technology of DNA identification 
should be carried, but it does reveal that the question cannot 
be ignored. 
